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ABSTRACT
The purposes of this study are two* to differentiate 
between the several meanings that various authors have 
given to the term "Balance of Power," and to compare a 
balance of power international system with a bipolar inter - 
national system.
In making this comparison two paradigms are con - 
structed, one of a balance of power system, another of a 
bipolar system. In the balance of power system three 
types of policy are explored: automatic, semi - automatic,
and manual. In addition, a distinction is made between 
the operator in a semi - automatic system and the balancer 
found in all balance of power systems.
In the bipolar system two types of policy are explored: 
automatic and manual. Loose and tight bloc systems are also 
examined, along with contagious competition between the 
super powers.
The comparison of the two systems suggests that while 
they have similarities in structure, the difference in the 
number of essential actors in each system has a profound 
effect upon the operation of the systems. The bipolar 
system has contagious competition, while a balance of power 
system does not. Alliance systems are more rigid and prone 
toward the formation of blocs in the bipolar system.
Ideology and nationalism also play a greater role in the 
operation of the bipolar system.
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THE BALANCE OP POWER AND BIPOLARITYs 
A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
In attempting to conduct a precise discussion of any 
particular aspect of international politics, it is essential 
that one define precisely what he means when he uses any 
particular term. This is important because any scientific 
observation can only be so when the findings of one indi - 
vidual are transmissible to others. In order for such 
findings to be intertransmissible, they must be carefully 
defined in order that others may understand them. This is 
a particularly important aspect of a discussion that is to 
center around a term that is as vague as the balance of 
power.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the use of the phrase 
"balance of power" has been so ambiguous in the past, for 
this makes it extremely difficult for one to conduct a 
scientific inquiry into a very important feature of inter - 
national politics. A vague use of any term, in any 
discipline, can do little to contribute to a greater 
understanding of problems associated with that term. In 
the physical sciences, it was found necessary to establish 
an absolute definition of freezing in order that variations
2
3in climate and air pressure would not be able to effect 
the reports of certain experiments. With such an absolute 
definition, it was found that natural scientists could 
attain a greater degree of accuracy in their inquiry than 
they had previously approached, and that the intertrans - 
missibility of their findings was greater, due to the fact 
that there was no longer any doubt as to the temperature 
at which an observation took place. The manner in which 
the balance of power has been used has been plagued with 
problems similar to those which plagued physical scientists 
attempting to establish an exact temperature reading in the 
absence of a precise definition of zero. Theorists using 
the term have done so without establishing an exact reference 
point that would allow one to determine how the concept was 
being used. Imprecise use of the term has caused it to 
take on the characteristics of a blanket that is placed 
over many differing types of power relationships. This has 
created a situation in which one finds it difficult to 
determine the exact nature of what is being described.
In using the phrase '"balance of power," one can be 
seeking to describe several different things. Hans Mor - 
genthau used the term in several ways: as a policy aimed
4at a certain state of affairs, as an approximately equal 
state of affairs, as an actual state of affairs, or as any 
distribution of power.* Organski begins by describing the 
balance of power as a system in which there are "a large 
number of nations with varying amounts of power, each one 
striving to maximize its own power,” but then goes on to 
use the same term to describe two different distributions 
of power, a "simple,” and a "multiple" balance, as he calls 
t h e m .^ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff conceive of the balance 
of power "as a situation or condition, as a universal 
tendency or law of state behavior, as a guide for states - 
manship, and as a mode of system - maintenance characteristic 
of certain types of international s y s t e m s . "3 Ernst B.
Haas found eight different uses for the terras (1) any 
distribution of power, whether distributed evenly among a 
number of states, or centered in the hands of just a few,
(2) an equilibrium in which two sides have a nearly equal 
amount of strength, (3 ) hegemony, where one particulair 
state, or group of states, dominates, (4) stability and 
peace in a concert of power, such as the nineteenth century 
concert of Europe, (5) instability and war, in which the 
states in the system attempt to constrain a member that
5threatens to dominate, (6 ) power polities, in general,
(7 ) a universal law of history, and (8 ) a system and guide 
to policy makers.^ Inis Claude views these various 
definitions as being only three uses of the term: a cer -
tain distribution of power, whether strength is spread 
evenly among many, or just a few, states, a certain type 
of policy, which may include attempts at preponderance, as 
weli as the formation of coalitions to check attempts at 
hegemony, and a certain type of system consisting of in - 
dependent states controlling their own power and policy.5
In examining the uses of the concept as he does, Claude 
adds considerably to the accuracy of one who uses the term, 
for he encourages one to use the balance of power to refer 
only to a system. When one wishes to speak in terms of a 
policy, Claude believes that he should use the word policy 
rather than balance of power. References to a distribution 
of power should call it that, rather than continuing to 
cloud the meaning of a useful concept.
Before Claude undertook to examine the various uses 
of the concept of the balance of power, it was especially 
difficult to develop a body of knowledge based upon the 
works of predecessors, due to the tendency to believe that
6any one theorist had failed to describe all of the features 
of the balance of power. This caused people to seek to add 
continuously to the concept in an effort to insure that all 
bases were touched. This meant, however, that the concept 
of the balance of power could never escape a circular 
route by which it was described and redescribed. It is 
now possible, however, to carefully consider the implica - 
tions of some of the particular features of the balance of 
power, for the idea should now be limited to a particular 
system. This allows one to examine the term in one light,
thus allowing for a greater degree of accuracy and
scientific inquiry.
Using balance of power to denote a particular type of 
system will allow one to be precise in his communication 
of his thoughts to others, provided that the features of 
such a system axe described adequately. This will provide 
theorists with an absolute point from which to work when 
attempting to build a theory and will insure that any 
attack upon a particular theory will not be due to a mis -
understanding of the manner in which terms are used, but
rather will center upon the nature of the theory itself and 
its ability to describe particular characteristics of
international politics.
In examining the literature that has been written in 
recent years concerning the balance of power, however, one 
finds that two things have been neglected. The first is 
that there have been no attempts to correct the imprecision 
that exists in some of Inis Claude's discussion of the 
balance of power in his book Power and International 
Relations, while the second is that several potentially 
useful concepts introduced by Claude have not been explored 
as thoroughly as they deserve to be. Vernon Van Dyke notes 
that Claude has recommended that the term balance of power 
should be used to describe a system, but then fails to go 
any further in examining Claude's work.6 Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff also mention Claude but fail to analyze any of 
his concepts in detail.? This is unfortunate, for it would 
seem that one could use Claude's analysis of the balance 
of power as a reference point for further study once some 
of the imprecision has been eliminated. I shall therefore 
devote a portion of this thbsis to an explanation of Claude' 
notions concerning the balance of power, paying particular 
attention to the three types of policy that he suggests may 
be used by the states within the system, automatic,
8semi - automatic, and manual.
In attempting this, I shall construct first a model 
of a balance of power system. In building this model, I 
will attempt to correct some difficulties that I believe 
exist in Claude's work - most notably distinguishing between 
a balancer and an operator in a balance of power system. 
Having constructed a balance of power model, I will then 
develop a paradigm of a bipolar system, introducing the 
concept of contagious competition which I have borrowed 
from Maurice Duverger and adapted to an international 
setting. Both of these models will be based upon the as - 
sumption that it is security interests that cause states 
to act as they do. With this in mind, an attempt will be 
made to determine the logical features of a balance of power 
system and of a bipolar system, treating security interests 
as an independent variable, with the behavior of the states 
in the system being a dependent variable. Once a logical 
relationship has been established, perceptions of security 
will be manipulated (from dependence upon one's own 
abilities to dependence upon the smooth operation of the 
system) to determine the logical effects of such alterations 
upon the dependent variable. The number of essential.
actors (those states capable of exerting influence upon any 
other state within the system) is also viewed as an indepen 
dent variable, with logical inferences being drawn from a 
change in their number from two to three or more.
In developing these models I make no claim to an 
explicit representation of reality, past, present, or 
future. References in this thesis to real situations are 
made only in an effort to clarify theoretical assumptions 
posited? they sire not an attempt to explain these situations 
I am also aware of the possibility that certain features
i
of my paradigms are present in all types of international 
systems. The paradigms constructed here are designed to 
represent optimally functioning systems based upon security 
interests. Such optimal models are constructed in prefer - 
ence to describing any particular system that may be dis - 
covered in history due to the difficulty of uncovering what 
may be regarded as "pure” examples. An example of such a 
difficulty is that of determining whether the ancient Greek 
rivalry between Athens and Sparta was an example of a 
balance of power system or of a bipolar system. I would 
classify it in the former category? yet, many might well 
believe it to belong to the latter classification. This
10
difference of opinion could well distract a reader from the 
theoretical examination being made. The construction of a 
model not purporting to depict a particular part of reality 
aids in overcoming this problem, for it allows one to ex - 
amine the validity of the argument being presented, rather 
than the correctness of the classification made. Further - 
more, the construction of a "pure" system aids in the 
elimination of much of the ambiguity found in real situa - 
tions.
The value of a work examining such pure systems may 
be questioned. The answer to such questioning is that such 
a study is useful to the extent that it allows future ob - 
servers to predict the behavior of a state in particular 
situations. A knowledge of the logical behavior of a state 
in either a bipolar system or a balance of power system in 
which security is the motivating force provides the observer 
with at least partial grounds upon which to judge how such 
a state may behave. While security interests are not the 
only factors affecting a state's behavior, I posit that in 
certain instances, these interests are the overriding force 
behind a state's behavior. To the extent that this is true, 
a knowledge of the logical consequences of such behavior
11
allows for prediction. Predictability is enhanced by sub - 
dividing a balance of power system into automatic, semi - 
automatic, and manual systems, and a bipolar system into 
automatic and manual systems, allowing one to determine the 
type of system in operation and the logical behavior that 
may be expected of states in such a system.
In comparing the two paradigms I construct in this 
thesis, I wish to prove the hypothesis that the differences 
in the manner in which a balance of power system and a 
bipolar system operate are due to the differences in the 
number of essential actors found in each system, the bipolar 
system having only two such actors, while a balance of power 
system has three or more. I will attempt to show that this 
difference in the number of essential actors affects the 
type of competition found in each system, with only the 
bipolar system having contagious competition, the extent 
to which the states in each system engage in ideological 
and nationalistic conflicts, the type of alliance structures 
found in each system, and the nature of the arms buildups.
In discussing power, I shall confine myself largely to 
military power at the expense of economic power, both to 
simplify the discussion somewhat, and because my own
12
knowledge of economics is rather limited.
This thesis is therefore designed as a modeling exer - 
cise in which I will attempt to illustrate some of the 
concepts Professor Claude developed in his analysis of the 
balance of power, introduce the notion of contagious com - 
petition, and show that while two international systems may 
be structurally similar, a change in the number of essential 
actors from two to three or more can indeed cause these 
systems to differ in their operation.
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CHAPTER I
A SYSTEM, A DISTRIBUTION, AND A POLICY
A balance of power system is an arrangement within 
which states act autonomously, without the controlling 
direction of a superior a.gencyt to manipulate power re - 
lationships among themselves.i These relationships are 
manipulated by the various states in an attempt to cope 
with the "security dilemma.” This term is used to refer 
to the inability of the states in the system to develop a 
sense of security due to the threat that they pose to one 
another. Each state feels that the behavior of the other 
states within the system may create a dangerous environ - 
ment. Thus, each state feels compelled to build its power 
in an effort to increase its security. An increase in the 
strength of one state, which may develop greater security 
for it, is viewed as a threat by its neighboring states and 
tends to develop more insecurity for them. This causes 
them to build their strength in an effort to decrease their 
insecurity. Such a development, however, has the effect 
of causing other states to feel insecure and in need of 
more power. Thus, a cycle develops in which the security
1^
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of one state is obtained only by creating insecurity among 
other states. The advancement in power by one state is 
viewed with jealousy and uneasiness by the remaining states 
in the system rather than with an eye to indifference.2 
This means that unless there is some sort of superior 
agency to regulate the power relationships among states in 
such a way as to create an equal sense of security among 
them all, these states will have a tendency to manipulate 
these relationships themselves in an effort to obtain 
security, and competition will emerge as the means by which 
power is managed in the sy s t e m .3
A balance of power system is a decentralized system; 
power and policy remain in the hands of its constituent 
units. Concern with developing greater strength causes 
the system to have alliances as states attempt to enhance 
their power both by building up their resources, and by 
linking themselves to the power of other states. The 
system has particular features but does not move toward 
any particular result, apart from the prevention of hegemony 
by one state or alliance over the remainder of the system, 
since the primary actors - the states - are not so much 
concerned with ends as they are with the means by which
they may feel secure. In such a system, statesmen do not 
deal with abstractions (such as ideologies) but work with 
the realities of international politics, particularly those 
involving national military strength and the threats it may 
pose.^ The competitive nature of the system dictates that 
this be true, since competition makes the political power 
in the system expansionist by nature,5 requiring that states 
men work to expand the political influence of their state, 
while at the same time seeking to limit the influence of 
other states in the system. This tends to make security 
something that is ever sought but never actually attained 
by any state in the system. It also tends to give the 
system at once both a potential for creativity, as states - 
men continuously seek new means for the pursuit of security, 
and a potential for destruction, since the competitive na - 
ture of the system tends to insure that states within the 
system will clash with one another in wars as their 
interests come into conflict.6
Every balance of power system must include a state 
that is capable of being a b a l a n c e r .7 This means that the 
system must have enough members that there is the possi - 
bility that two or more can combine in an alliance in order
17
to offset the power of any state that threatens to dominate 
the system. When there is a state with the potential to 
dominate the system, then the other states within the 
system will seek to balance its strength by forming a league 
of defense. Power must be distributed in such a way that 
no state will inherently dominate the system, and the 
states in the system must be free to maneuver to form 
leagues of defense. In the formation of such a league, it 
is the state which initiates the discussion of its crea - 
tion that may be called the balancer. Thus, the balancer 
is whichever state becomes concerned at the rising power 
of some other state in the system and determines that its 
power must be countered. This means that the role of 
balancer need not always be played by the same state, that 
this state need not be a particularly powerful state (for 
it need only be perceptive), and that the precise state 
that plays the role of balancer may be vague in many s i t ­
uations, especially if several states become aware of the 
danger posed by a neighbor at nearly the same time. The 
central role that alliances and leagues of defense play in 
a balance of power system dictates that there is always a 
balancer in such a system.
In the past, balance of power systems have always
tended to develop in a particular region. This is sug -
gested by Herbert Butterfield when he says that "states of
Renaissance Italy, like those of ancient Greece, formed a
neat, closed area in which the principle might be expected
to develop."^ This would be a natural development since
the power politics that nurture the development of a
balance of power system grow out of the "security dilemma,"
which would tend to dictate that a state concern itself
with the threats posed by immediate neighbors. A state
that is too far away to bring her strength to bear poses
little danger no matter how powerful she may be. Arnold
Toynbee illustrates this well in the following passage:
At the center (of the group of states forming 
the balance of power system), every move that 
one state makes with a view to its own aggrandize - 
ment is jealously watched and adroitly countered 
by all its neighbors, and the sovereignty over 
a few square feet of territory and a few hundred 
"souls" becomes the subject of the bitterest and 
stubbornest contention.... In the easy circum - 
stances of the periphery, quite a mediocre 
political talent is often able to work wonders....
The domain of the United States can be expanded 
unobstrusively right across North America from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific, the domain of Russia 
right across Asia from Baltic to Pacific, in an 
age when the best statesmen of France or Germany 
can not avail to obtain unchallenged possession 
of an Alsace or a Posen.9
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Thus, states that are situated close to one another care - 
fully watch each other’s behavior out of a fear that any 
additions to the power of one will directly threaten the 
security of the other, while states that are not in the 
same region go unnoticed, since the power that they may 
accumulate is of little consequence unless it can be de - 
livered effectively upon states that are at a distance 
from it.
This produces an unwillingness on the part of states 
in a balance of power system to compromise on issues that 
arise within the region in which the system exists, since 
these issues will tend to be viewed as vital, while at the 
same time creating a propensity on the part of these same 
states to bargain and compromise with one another when the 
controversy at hand involves issues that do not arise 
within the region. As these extra - regional controversies 
take place closer to the region in which the system exists, 
however, the ability of the states in the region to com - 
promise lessens. Hans Morgenthau points this out when he 
states that the most explosive extra - European issues of 
the period from 1870 to 1910 involved an area situated 
relatively close to the balance of power system itself - the
20
division of the disintegrating Turkish Empire among the 
European powers.10
David Hume, in his essay "Of the Balance of Power," 
lists several examples of instances in which balance of 
power systems have existed. He states that Thucydides 
describes such a system in his account of the Peloponnesian 
War, in which a league was formed among Grecian states to 
combat the rise in the strength of Athens. He speaks of 
the manner in which Mediterranean states banded together 
in an effort to counter the rising power of Alexander in 
order that they could avoid the tyranny of a universal 
monarchy. He also discusses the rise of a balance of power 
system in Europe in the wake of the power of the House of 
Austria.1* In each instance, Hume illustrates the regional 
nature of the system by describing the manner in which it 
was a product of what was perceived as a threat by an im - 
mediate neighbor. It is interesting to note that there is 
a trend in which the size of the area in which the system 
exists increases, from the Grecian states, to the Eastern 
Mediterranean states, to the European states. This would 
seem to be, at least in part, due to the increasing size 
of states and to their increasing ability through technology
21
and communications to bring their strength to bear upon 
other states.
It would seem possible that balance of power systems 
might not only coexist adjacent to each other in differing 
regions, but also alongside each other in the same region, 
thereby forming sub - balance of power systems within a 
larger regional balance of power system. Morgenthau iden - 
tifies such sub - balance of power systems as being local, 
citing the development of an Italian balance of power 
system in the fifteenth century as an example of such a 
system, with the larger system being composed of the great 
nations of Europe.*2 Such a local system might be said to 
have existed in the Balkans where Austria, Russia, and 
Serbia were poised just prior to World War I, but where 
France, Germany, and Britain were primarily interested only 
to the extent that no single state would dominate the area, 
and over the control of Belgium during the same period 
where Great Britain, France, and Germany all had interests, 
while Austria and Russia were not actually drawn into the 
contest. These local systems tended to develop out of con - 
tests among neighboring states over a particular issue in 
which these states were especially interested, believing
22
that vital interests were at stake. It should not, how - 
ever, be surmised that these local issues were not of 
significance to the remaining states in the regional 
system, for they were. The distinction that can be made, 
however, is that while the states in a local balance of 
power system were constantly and daily concerned with these 
issues, the other states in the region could afford to 
neglect the issues so long as it did not appear that it 
would be resolved in the favor of one of the states in the 
local system. As long'as competition among the states in 
the local system existed, the remaining states in the 
region could afford to partially ignore the issue; however, 
when competition threatened to cease, then all of the states 
in the region had cause for alarm lest the repercussions 
of this lack of competition be felt by them, due to an in - 
crease in strength by one particular state.
Thus, when one speaks of a balance of power system, 
one is speaking of an arrangement within which states act 
autonomously, have control over their own power and policy, 
are free to form alliances, do not have any particular goal 
in mind toward which they are moving other than to prevent 
hegemony by others, and concern themselves with the
23
realities of power politics rather than with commitments 
to such abstractions as ideologies. Such a system may be 
of a regional nature (at least it has been so in the past) 
and has enough members that one can serve as balancer.
Within any balance of power system there is a dis - 
tribution of power. The manner in which power is dis - 
tributed calls to mind the Newtonian system of astronomy. 
All the various bodies, the greater and the lesser powers, 
are poised against one another, each exercising a kind of 
gravitational pull on all the rest - and the pull of each 
is proportionate to its mass and its distance.13 As the 
distance becomes too great, or its size too small, a par - 
ticular body is eliminated from consideration as a member 
of the system. In such a situation, gravity depicts the 
strength a state possesses, and the distribution of mass 
among the bodies in the system determines what type of 
system will exist. If the bodies within the system are 
approximately equal in mass, then they will pull almost 
equally upon neighboring states, and no one state, or group 
of states, will dominate. A group of bodies could have a 
greater mass than the rest, therefore having a greater pull 
than the others, thus dominating the system. It is also
24
possible for one state to dominate by being so much larger 
than the rest that it can exert enough pull to control the 
behavior of all the others.
In speaking of the distribution of power, one usually 
refers to one of these situations: an even distribution,
a distribution within which a group of states is dominant, 
or a distribution that gives preponderance to a particular 
state. I**’ A balance of power system may be said to function 
best when power in the system is distributed either evenly 
among all states, or among a rather large group of states 
in the system. This is so because the "security dilemma” 
dictates that all of the states within the system would 
ideally like to dominate it, but that when it is not pos - 
sible for a state to dominate the system, then it would 
feel most secure if power were distributed rather evenly 
among a large number of states. Thus, reacting to main - 
tain an equilibrium is the nature of the balance of power 
system because it is when all states are more or less equal 
in strength, or belong to alliances that have equal power, 
that they feel least threatened and most secure.^5
This means that it is most difficult, if not im - 
possible, for a balance of power system to function when
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the distribution of power gives preponderance to one par - 
ticular state. In such a situation, it becomes necessary 
for the remaining states in the system to remain members 
of a league of defense almost constantly in order that they 
may offset the power of their neighbor, if indeed their 
collective power is sufficient to do so. Such a require - 
ment tends to place great strains upon the system due to 
the problems inherent with the maintenance of an alliance. 
It becomes possible for the powerful state to play upon the 
jealousies and arguments among the states belonging to the 
league and to pry members away from it through flattery and 
promises, causing the league to fail in its purpose, 
leaving the less powerful states individually to its mercy. 
For the states in the league to allow themselves to be 
broken apart in such a manner would not be wise, but it 
would be natural, for the competition among states that 
aids in the management of power in a balance of power 
system does not vanish totally with the formation of an 
a l l i a n c e . Thus, while it is possible that a balance of 
power system can operate when the distribution of power 
gives preponderance to a particular state, it is doubtful 
that it will operate with success over long periods of time
26
in such a situation.
A balance of power system operates most successfully 
when power is distributed in such a manner as to allow a 
number of states to participate actively, for the greater 
the number of active players, the greater the number of 
possible combinations and the greater also the uncertainty 
as to the combinations that will actually oppose each 
other and as to the role individual players will actually 
perform in them.^7 This means ideally that power should 
be distributed among all of the states in the system in 
order that they may all engage in the competition and 
maneuvering that insures them the greatest amount of 
security. If strength is not distributed evenly among all 
of the states in the system, then it is best for the main - 
tenance of the system that it be distributed among several 
strong states since the desire for security and the natural 
urge to compete will cause these states to be unable to 
ally together to dominate the system, thus at least par - 
tially insuring the security of all states in the system, 
except in instances when the partition of one of the weaker 
states is deemed necessary for the preservation of the 
system. A wide distribution of power among a number of
27
stronger states means that aggression cannot succeed un - 
less it is so moderate and so directed that the prevailing 
opinions of the other stronger powers approve it.*® This 
at least gives the lesser powers in the system the oppor - 
tunity to appeal to the major states and play them off 
against each other when they are threatened, making them 
more secure than they would be if power were more narrowly 
distributed.
Thus, an examination of the distribution of power in 
a balance of power system allows one to investigate the 
policies of the states within the system to observe how 
they may react to balance the increase in the strength of 
any particular member, or members, of the system. The 
manner in which states maintain an even distribution of 
power is determined by the policy they pursue. (Policy is 
used here to connote an overall plan which takes all known 
contingencies into account. Strategy is the term that will 
be used in dealing with any particular contingency). Inis 
Claude lists three types of policy that can be used by a 
state when it manipulates power relationships in a balance 
of power systems automatic, semi - automatic, and manual.*9
Automatic operation of the balance of power system is
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reminiscent of the operation of physical laws. A passage
from Rousseau describes its
The actual system of Europe has precisely the 
degree of solidity which maintains it in a 
constant state of motion without upsetting it.
The balance existing between the power of 
these diverse members of the European society 
is more the work of nature than of art. It 
maintains itself without effort, in such a 
manner that if it sinks on one side, it re - 
establishes itself very soon on the other.20
Thus, the automatic operation of the balance of power
system occurs naturally when a member of the system
develops more strength. It will occur naturally as a part
of the ’’security dilemma." Any increase in the power of
one part of the system will cause anxiety among the other
members of the system. This will cause them to pursue
strategies by which they may increase their strength to
balance, or even to surpass, that of other states. It is
competition among the states in the system that insures
that an equilibrium will be maintained, for no one state
will be allowed to get too far ahead of the others. If
any one state, or group of states, begins to threaten
hegemony, then the balancer signals to the remaining states
that it is necessary to form a league of defense, thus
reestablishing an equilibrium.
29
States that act according to an automatic policy are 
not necessarily aware of the existence of a balance of 
power system as such, and if they are, they do not regard 
the smooth functioning of the system as a guarantee of 
their security. It is quite possible that all of the mem - 
bers of the system would pursue a winning strategy - that 
is, a strategy whose fulfillment would allow them to dom - 
inate the system, if they had the ability to do so, even 
though domination by one member might destroy the system.
In fact, all states actively participating in the system 
will most probably aim not at a balance - that is, 
equality - of power, but at superiority of power in their 
own behalf.21 It is the pursuit of such a winning strategy 
by several members of the system that allows it to balance 
itself naturally.
Claude's concept of a semi - automatic operation of 
the balance of power system is illustrated best by the 
British policy toward the European system in the -nine - 
teenth century. Such a policy is suited best to instances 
where the opposing sides are approximately equal in 
strength and appeal to the operator. It calls for a some - 
what aloof position, from which the manipulator can
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maneuver to support first one, then the other side, de -
pending upon which party best suits the operator's in -
terests. The operator is not permanently identified with
the policies of either of the opposing sides. Its only
objective within the system is the maintenance of the system,
regardless of the concrete policies the prevailing side will
serve. The operator has neither permanent friends nor ene -
mies; its only permanent interest is the maintenance of the
system, for it is in the proper functioning of the system
that it feels its security is served best.^2 As Sir Eyre
Crowe states:
History shows that the danger threatening the 
independence of this or that nation has gener - 
ally arisen at least in part, out of the momen - 
tary predominance of a neighboring state at once 
militarily powerful, economically efficient and 
ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its 
influence, the danger being directly proportion - 
ate to the degree of its power and efficiency, 
and to the spontaneity or "inevitableness" of 
its ambitions. The only check on the abuse of 
political predominance derived from such a posi - 
tion has always consisted in the opposition of 
an equally formidable rival, or of a combination 
of several countries forming leagues of defense.
The equilibrium established by such a grouping 
of forces is technically known as the balance 
of power, and it has become almost an historical 
truism to identify England's secular policy with 
the maintenance of this balance by throwing her 
weight now in this scale and now in that, but 
ever on the side opposed to the political
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dictatorship of the strongest single state or 
group at a given time.23
Thus, the balancer in a semi - automatic scheme is aware of
the existence of a balance of power system and feels that
it is through the efficient working of such an arrangement
that her security is enhanced. This awareness of the system
is a feature which helps differentiate semi - automatic from
automatic manipulation, even when two states behave similar -
ly. Hume stated that after the Peloponnesian War, "the
Athenians always threw themselves into the lighter scale,
and endeavored to preserve the b a l a n c e . S u c h  a policy
would appear the same as that which the British adopted in
the nineteenth century, for it sounds very similar to that
which Crowe enunciated. The difference between the two
policies is in the fact that the British knew that a balance
of power system existed, and attempted to work within it,
while the Athenians did not.25 This may be due to the fact,
as Herbert Butterfield points out, that the notion of a
balance of power system was developed as a result of the
adaption of Newton's theory of a field of forces in as -
tronomy to•international political theory.26
Semi - automatic manipulation is automatic in that the
operator will always throw its weight to whichever side is
deficient in strength. This takes away at least part of the 
element of choice that the operator may have, for while it 
consciously estimates which side is weakest, it will always 
pursue the single strategy of siding with whoever is weakest 
on any given occasion.
It is worth noting some of the differences between the 
balancer requisite to a balance of power system (who I shall 
refer to as the balancer) and the operator using a semi - 
automatic policy (who I shall call the operator in order 
to avoid confusion). In both cases, the states act in the 
manner which best enhances their security, pursuing a 
strategy which calls for siding with the weaker state in 
order to offset an increase in strength by an opposing state 
or group of states. The difference lies in whether the 
strategic act of siding with the less powerful is tied to 
an overall policy or is conceived of as an expediency. In 
the case of the semi - automatic operator, the strategy is 
a part of an overall policy which calls for placing one's 
weight where it may serve to counter the rise of any state 
to preponderance. This policy is formulated with a know - 
ledge of the existence of a balance of power system and with 
the desire to play the role of an operator in such a system.
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The operator attempts to keep the system intact through its 
actions because it feels its security, as well as that of 
the other states in the system, is greatest when the system 
functions smoothly. This means that the operator may act 
in behalf of the rest of the states in the system by playing 
the role of balancer and maintaining the system. In order 
to be especially effective, the operator should be in an 
aloof position in order that it can refrain from becoming 
involved in all disputes - a position often referred to as 
"splendid isolation,f* ^ 7 concerning itself only with those 
that it feels are of vital importance, and the operator must 
be strong enough that it is able to tip the distribution of 
power as it pleases when it commits itself.
The requisite balancer, however, is not of necessity 
always the same state. It can be any state who becomes 
concerned enough by the growth in strength of a neighbor 
that it seeks the formation of some sort of league of de - 
fense. Thus, the balancer is not pursuing any overall 
policy that dictates a particular strategic decision, but 
rather acts out of a desire to acquire more security. This 
balancer is not necessarily aware of the existence of a 
balance of power system, as is the operator in semi - auto -
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matic manipulation, nor need the balancer be a state power - 
ful enough to tip the distribution of power as it chooses.
It need only be perceptive enough to recognize the need for 
a realignment of the distribution of power within the 
system. This means that, strictly speaking, the balancer 
and the operator need not be the same state at all times, 
even in a semi - automatically manipulated system, for it 
is possible, though not probable, that a state other than 
the operator would recognize the need for a reexamination 
of the power relationships in the system and initiate the 
discussion of such an examination.
Manual operation of the balance of power system is a 
process within which the equilibrating process is a function 
of human contrivance. Reliance is placed neither on self - 
equilibrating tendencies among all states, nor on the care - 
fully timed and calculated adjustments performed by a holder 
of the balance on behalf of other states. The rise of this 
type of policy places an emphasis upon the skilled manage - 
ment of affairs by the statesmen who guide the actions of 
all the states in the system.28 Manual operation depends 
upon the realization by the statesmen that a balance of 
power system exists and the belief that it is within such a
framework that their state is most secure. It relies fur - 
ther upon the realization that a certain, tacitly agreed 
upon, body of rules must be created to guide the actions of 
the states in the system. Thus, a manually operated 
balance of power system is one in which the members of the 
system attempt to institutionalize the system somewhat, 
taking it off the ad hoc basis found to a large extent in 
both automatically and semi - automatically operated 
systems. The states in the system attempt to guarantee 
their security by developing a code of conduct that will 
temper their behavior. Agreements are reached regarding 
the distribution of power that will work best to maintain 
the system, in order that clashes due to attempts to gather 
ever greater amounts of strength will not threaten the 
system.
Morton Kaplan sets forth a set of basic rules which 
would tend to be tacitly agreed to in a manually operated 
system. The rules are that states would: 1. increase
capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight? 2. fight 
rather than fail to increase capabilities; 3. stop fight - 
ing rather than eliminate an essential actor; 4. oppose 
any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a
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position of predominance within the system; 5* constrain 
actors who subscribe to supranational organizational, prin - 
ciples; and 6. permit defeated or constrained essential 
national actors to reenter the system as acceptable role 
partners, or act to bring some previously unessential actor 
within the essential actor classification. All essential 
actors must be treated as acceptable role partners.^9 Ac - 
ceptance of these rules would tend to insure that while the 
states in the system would continue to compete with one 
another, they would have a set of guidelines to follow that 
could insure the preservation of the system on any particu - 
lar occasion.
The use of a manual policy is due to the awareness the 
manipulators have of the "security dilemma," and the feeling 
that it dictates that no state or alliance shall attempt to 
gather enough power to dominate the system. Whereas states 
may have chosen to pursue a winning strategy in using an 
automatic policy, the acceptance of a manual policy dictates 
that winning strategies that would destroy the system must 
be abandoned. This type of policy is complex, for it calls 
for a great amount of consensus among the statesmen within 
the system in order that it may be maintained. This
3?
requires that a very good communications network must exist 
to allow the leaders of the states to communicate with one 
another when problems develop to insure that no crisis ever 
causes a state to act unilaterally before everyone’s in - 
tent ions Eire known.
In summary, it can be said that there are three types 
of policies that states may pursue in a balance of power 
system: automatic, semi - automatic, and manual. These
policies are a product of whether none of the states, some, 
but not all of the states, or all of the states within the 
system are aware of its existence and feel most secure 
v/ithin such a system.
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CHAPTER II 
THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM
A. STRUCTURE AND SECURITY
The distribution of power in a bipolar world is such 
that two states, which shall be designated as super powers, 
have an overwhelming array of strength. This creates two 
definite classes of states, the super powers, and all other, 
lesser states. The latter may vary in size and strength, 
but their power is hardly comparable to that of the super 
powers. As in other models of the international system, 
there is no superior agency to direct and control power 
relationships in the system, for power and policy remain 
in the hands of its constituent units - the states. All 
the states in the system are therefore responsible for 
maintaining their own security, for there is no other body 
to do this for them. This means that the states must seek 
to build their power in the belief that strength brings 
security. In such a situation, competition among the states 
emerges as the means by which power in the system is 
managed. Each state attempts to build its power to match 
the advances in strength made by such other states as are
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in a position to pose a threat to its security. Such com - 
petition manages power in the sense that it guarantees that 
no particular state will be able to amass enough strength 
to enable it to dominate the system. Competition does not, 
however, manage power in the sense that particular amounts 
of strength are delegated to specific states as a part of 
some sort of grand plan for the distribution of power within 
the system.
The competition for power in a bipolar system takes 
place at two fairly distinct levels, global and regional.
The global level is dominated by the super powers, while 
regional competition may take place without interference 
from the super powers, although, in particular situations, 
such intervention may occur. That competition takes place 
at two levels is due to the circumstances that present them - 
selves to the actors in the bipolar system. On the one 
hand, the super powers must, out of necessity, play the 
global game, for they pose distinct threats to each other 
which demands that they strive for power vis a vis each 
other. At the same time, the super powers may well perceive 
that they have vital interests spread throughout the various 
regions of the earth, which compels them to engage in re -
h2
gional struggles for power from time to time to protect 
these interests.
One finds that the lesser states are in the complicated 
position of feeling the pressure of threats to their 
security from several, sources - the super powers, lesser 
states in the same region, and perhaps even some lesser 
powers from other regions. This dictates that the lesser 
states keep a watchful eye upon the global competition, 
seeking to build an alliance or understanding of some sort 
with one or the other of the super powers who will guaran - 
tee their security. At the same time, the lesser states 
must concern themselves with the machinations of the various 
states in their own region. This dictates that they develop 
some regional ties that will assist them in the event of 
aggression in their particular region. These ties would 
be intra - regional rather than extra - regional. A super 
power is only likely to guarantee a state’s position with 
regard to intra - regional aggression if that particular 
state is of vital importance to it, or if the aggression 
appears to be directed by the other super power. Lesser 
states may also seek ties with a super power in order to 
secure its support in regional conflicts.
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The lesser powers must also concern themselves with 
activities in other regions that they deem to be of vital 
interest to themselves. Thus, they need to develop a net - 
work of contacts in other regions that will help to insure 
that events will not take such a turn as to damage these 
interests. The recent Arab oil embargo and its effect upon 
all of the industrial states of the world illustrates the 
necessity of such contacts. Indeed the French agreement 
with Iran regarding nuclear reactors and oil purchases il - 
lustrates an attempt by a state in one region to develop 
contacts in another region in order to offset possible 
developments that might prove to be detrimental.
Despite all the complexities involved, competition in 
a bipolar world system revolves very particularly around the 
two super powers. This is true because the super powers 
alone have sufficient power to threaten and destroy any 
other state in the system. Thus, the very existence of the 
remaining states, and of the system itself, depends upon 
the super powers and their ability to check one smother. 
Should one of the super powers surpass the other, the 
system itself could reach the point where all states would 
find themselves subservient to the wishes of the prevailing
super power. On the other hand, if the competition leads 
to war between the super powers, the system, and the states 
within the system, could be annihilated. This means that 
all eyes in the system are, of necessity, upon the struggle 
between the big tv/o.
B. CONTAGION AND THE AUTOMATIC SYSTEM
The competition between the super powers revolves 
around two perceptions of how they may best maintain their 
security. The first view involves the belief that security 
is a function of one’s own individual efforts, while the 
second tends to attach security more to an optimally func - 
tioning state system. In this latter system, each state 
remains the ultimate guardian of its own interests, but a 
set of principles is developed to guide the conduct of the 
states within the system in order that differences among 
these states may be resolved short of war. The type of 
competition associated with the first perception is zero - 
sum, while that associated with the second is nonconstant - 
sum.
Zero - sum competition regards a gain for any state as 
an absolute loss for all other actors within the system.*
In a zero - sum situation, the competition between the super
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powers develops a particular ruthlessness that enters into 
every phase of the international system, with each pushing 
the other to extremes limited only by each side's counter - 
acting power. The potential for accommodation and com - 
promise diminishes under such circumstances, for neither 
side is able to afford the possibility that an agreement 
may break down, leaving it at a disadvantage.
Nonconstant - sum competition, in contrast to zero - 
sum, is characterized by the belief that advances by one 
state do not at all times automatically translate into 
losses for all other states, though it is recognized that 
at times they may. There is a realization that all dif - 
ferences between states are not irreconcilable, that co - 
operation is possible in certain circumstances where it may 
add to one's security, and that some agreements may be 
reached permitting all states in the system to benefit.2 
Opportunities for accommodation and compromise are explored 
when possible; however, competition for the sake of main - 
taining security remains. Policies that are guided by the 
nonconstant - sum view may be designated as manual, while 
those that are guided by the zero - sum approach are auto - 
matic. Automatic policies have no explicit recognition of
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any systematic manner of handling disputes, while manual 
policies are conscious of this possibility but are equally 
aware of the fact that it is not always possible to resolve 
disputes in this manner, and that the ultimate guarantee of 
security rests in one’s own defenses.
The competition between super powers adhering to auto - 
matic policies will develop a contagious nature similar to 
that described by Maurice Duverger in his discussion of two 
party systems.3 This means that any means that one super 
power uses toward the end of accumulating power must be 
adopted by the other super power as well. Contagion is due 
to two factors: the inability of the super powers to form
alliances with other states to help maintain their security 
with regard to one another, and the constant awareness of 
exactly who the primary opponent is. The inability to form 
an alliance to aid in the global struggle forces the super 
powers to rely almost exclusively upon their own ability to 
increase their strength. One super power cannot afford the 
luxury of allowing the other to leap ahead of it in strength, 
for there is virtually no possibility of countering such an 
increase through the formation of some sort of league of 
defense with other states. Each super power must remain
in a state of constant vigilance, matching the tactics and 
devices used by the other side in order to avoid the pos - 
sibility of falling too far behind.
At the same time, both super powers are able to closely 
monitor one another to determine precisely what strategies 
and weapons systems are available in the search for power. 
This information, together with the knowledge that the other 
super power would be one’s sure opponent in the event of 
an armed conflict, places a tremendous amount of pressure 
upon both super powers to adopt any device that the other 
appears to be developing that may add to its strength.
This means, of course, that successful, as well as some un - 
successful, strategies will be copied for one’s own use.
The perceptions that the super powers have of the 
realities of the system have a great impact upon their be - 
havior. An objective appraisal of the power relationships 
in the system, if it were possible, would give each super 
power the ability to see precisely what contribution 
particular devices and strategies used by the opponent would 
make to his power. Calculations would then be made re - 
garding the usefulness of employing a similar device. The 
pressures of the international system, however, make such
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objectivity difficult to obtain, and subjective and biased 
assessments are likely to inflate the importance of certain 
devices or strategies, causing the super powers to compete 
in areas where a gain may be of little importance.
Under such conditions, it is quite likely, perhaps 
even inevitable, that competition for the sake of staying 
numerically ahead of one’s opponent emerges as the central 
guiding principle of the policies of the super powers, 
rather than a competition that is linked to the necessities 
of security.^ Thus, the drive to secure new weapons 
systems may outstrip the security need. Both super powers 
may be in possession of what may be viewed as the ultimate 
weapon (i.e. nuclear weapons), and may even have a suf - 
ficient number of the weapons stockpiled to totally destroy 
the opponent, and yet continue to engage in an extremely 
expensive and dangerous game of attempting to quantitatively 
outstrip one’s opponent. The reason for this seeming madness
1
lies primarily in the functioning of the system, for both 
super powers are well aware of almost precisely the number 
and types of weapons the other possesses and are sorely 
tempted to have just a few more in order to have a slight 
edge, although the degree to which this may enhance one's
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security may be negligible.
Qualitative development follows much the same pattern, 
with both super powers being aware of the degree of 
sophistication each possesses. This places pressure upon 
both to match or surpass the weapons technology of the 
other, leading to the development of ever more complex 
systems of destruction, which may or may not add appreciably 
to the security of either side.
The urge to engage in this type of competition is de - 
rived from the automatic nature of the system, where a gain 
for one side is viewed as being virtually equivalent to a 
loss for the other. This causes each side to strive to keep 
pace with or outstrip the other, even when such competition 
is likely to add greater danger to the system through the 
creation of ever more sophisticated means of destroying it.
In a system in which no ultimate weapon yet exists, and 
v/here conventional weapons alone are available to the members 
of the system, such competition may indeed bring about a 
measurable increase in the security of the states involved, 
but only up to a certain point. Even in this situation, a 
time is reached where increases, such as in the number of 
soldiers, guns, etc. do not actually bring an appreciably
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greater degree of security. One may, however, draw the 
distinction that this threshold is reached sooner when both 
sides are dealing with an ultimate system such as nuclear 
weapons.
The contagious competition between the super powers, 
however, does not limit itself to an arms race. Rather it 
reaches deeply into every aspect of their relations both 
with one another and with the rest of the states in the 
system. Contagion touches ideological conflicts, economic 
competition, and the formation of alliances. The striving 
for security inherent in the system causes the super powers 
to grasp at any means available that could offer to increase 
their strength. This couples with the fact that the super 
powers are posed against one another as declared enemies.
In such a situation, it is natural that both sides would 
believe that their own position is the morally "correct” 
one and that the opposition is wrong insofar as it strays 
from that position. Passions become principles, ambitions 
noble causes, and conflicts crusades.5 It is but a short 
step from espousing such views to setting them down as a 
theoretical guide for one’s followers. Once such a guide 
has been produced, one may say that the super power has an
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ideology, a means which may be used in an effort to convert 
or confuse members of the opposition. The use of such a 
tool by one super power quite readily calls for its use by 
the other, and an ideological conflict between the super 
powers arises. The power of such a weapon is great, for 
ideas, by their very nature are universal, with their only 
passport being their moral and logical validity.6 In order 
to undermine one’s opponent, one only has to think and 
speak, to promise a better life.
The use of the ideological tool theoretically may take 
place on two levels: it may be a part of a reasoned de -
bate, or it may be projected as a part of the passionate 
conflicts between the super powers. It is on the second 
level that the tool is used, for it allows the governments 
to stir up the moral indignation of their own people and the 
peoples of other states without having ever to concede a 
point of argument to the opposition - as one must often do 
in a more reasonable debate. On the second level, one may 
always appear to be right, portraying the other side as 
wrong. The statesmen involved may actually and passionately 
believe they are correct, or they may be cynically using 
ideology as a means of acquiring greater influence both
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abroad and at home. In either case, the effect is much the 
same, for a hot and heavy firing of salvos of propaganda 
occurs, with each side attempting to influence followers of 
the other, not so much by the use of reason, as through the 
use of moral heat.
Propaganda may be used to undermine the other super 
power domestically and internationally. Domestically, one 
may seek to create pockets of opposition that may eventually 
flower into a fifth column of a sort, while internationally, 
one may seek to isolate one’s opponent by raising questions 
regarding its conduct and policies, and by holding out a 
better future through the acceptance of one’s own creed of 
conduct.
Propaganda may have a profound effect upon the domestic 
operation of the government, particularly in a democracy. 
Dissent, a cherished freedom in democracies, may come to be 
regarded as comforting the enemy and as the stirrings of a 
fifth column in support of the opposition. Such thoughts 
are made much easier by the fact that the democratic leaders 
themselves, whether knowingly or not, will tend to cloud 
their own reason by paying too close attention to their own 
propaganda. Moves to quash dissidents are made in the name
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of democracy and for reasons of national security. The 
truth itself is even disguised to fit one's own propaganda, 
and policies are kept as secret as possible in order that 
they will not be seen to contradict the banal declarations 
of propaganda. Ideological conflict and the extensive use 
of propaganda may have the effect of causing a democracy to 
accept as necessary some of the repressive methods of a 
totalitarian state (particularly if it competes against a 
totalitarian super power, which may seem to have an ad - 
vantage because it can control its population) in order to 
cover up the weakness - lack of secrecy - de Tocqueville 
detected in the operation of the foreign office of a 
democracy.7
Such an ideological conflict creates a situation in 
which the statesmen of both super powers become prone to 
abstractions, viewing the world through the tainted lenses 
of morali2ations, rather than concerning themselves with 
the concrete realities of the world about them. In such a 
situation, these leaders come to believe it sinful to 
negotiate with the other side. Compromises are out of the 
question, for to make a concession would be morally wrong. 
Thus, the leaders on both sides tend to unrealistically
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expect the other to admit its moral bankruptcy and to give 
in. This fails to occur, and since compromise is not pos - 
sible, the conflict rages on with no promise of an end, 
and with both attempting to reform the other by pouring 
propaganda upon its groups of supporters in an effort to 
erode its power base.
In the automatic bipolar system, alliances with super 
powers are sought by the lesser states in order that these 
states may secure themselves from the threat posed by one 
or the other of the super powers* In securing such an al - 
liance, the states feel that they not only secure themselves 
from the threat of a super power, but also add greatly to 
their security with regard to other, neighboring, lesser 
states. The super powers, on the other hand, may be expected 
to engage in such alliances for one of two reasons; out 
of a desire to obtain a base of operation that will allow 
for deployment of weapons systems closer to the opposing 
super power, or out of a need to increase one’s strength in 
a particular region. The lesser states pursue alliances 
out of a desire to increase enormously their power by adding 
to it that of a super power, v/hile the super powers actually 
add little to their already immense power through such
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alliances, except insofar as they obtain more favorable 
strategic positions vis a vis the other super power.
Thus, unaligned states may seek an alliance with a 
super power if they feel particularly threatened by one or 
the other of the super powers. Cuba may be taken as an 
example. After the Revolution, the perceived threat from 
the United States became great. Therefore, the Castro re - 
gime appealed to the Soviet Union for an alliance that 
would aid in securing Cuba from an American invasion. The 
Soviet Union was ready to come to such an agreement for 
entirely different reasons -because Cuba’s proximity to 
the United States would provide a base of operations ex - 
ceedingly close to American soil. In addition, the zero - 
sum competition within the system brought the Soviet Union 
to perceive itself as having an opportunity to make a gain 
that would be the equivalent of a loss to the other super 
power, the United States. Both sides benefited from such 
an alliance, as indeed must be true before an agreement is 
securable.
Another type of alliance is developed when one of the 
super powers perceives a threat to a particular region that 
it deems to be of great importance. In this case the super
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power will seek to conclude an alliance with friendly 
states in that region in an effort to strengthen itself in 
that area. This gain in strength occurs only in the region 
in which the alliance is formed and does not extend to 
other regions of the globe, nor does it have any effect 
upon the power relationships between the super powers. Such 
a regional alliance, however, is likely to prompt the other 
super power to seek one of its own in order that it will 
not fall behind in the competition for power.
The creation of alliances between lesser states and 
super powers may be said, at least in the initial stages, 
to give the super powers a remarkable degree of sway over 
the policies of the lesser states. This is due to the fact 
that the lesser states are more dependent upon the super 
powers than are the latter upon the former. This is be - 
cause the super powers possess the strength to protect their 
territorial integrity from any threat, while the lesser 
states are unable to protect themselves from the super 
powers, and indeed in many cases, even from other lesser 
states in the same region. Thus, the lesser states have a 
primary security need for such an alliance, while the need 
of the super powers is secondary - involving such things as
obtaining position over their rival and protecting economic 
interests. Primary security needs are those involving the 
maintenance of one’s territorial integrity, while secondary 
needs are those which may affect the quality of existence 
but are not directly related to the maintenance of ter - 
ritorial integrity.
This means that alliance systems in a bipolar world 
have a tendency to become rigid. This rigidity is in large 
part due to the fact that the lesser states generally have 
only one of two choices open when seeking to protect their 
security. One is to ally with the super power which is 
perceived as being most favorable to one’s position; the 
other is to remain unaligned, and thus, neutral. Should a 
state choose the first course, then it commits itself to 
the protective umbrella of a super power, finding that once 
so protected, it loses its ability to break free, both due 
to the fear that without such protection it would - since 
it is now marked as an accomplice of the opposition - be 
dealt with fearfully, and because it finds such protection 
psychologically comforting and is unwilling to venture out 
without such protective comfort. Nonalignment may appear 
as a reasonable alternative, but only for some states -
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principally those which are not in the path of confrontation 
between the super powers and which feel no particular threat 
from either. Thus, the European states, lying as they do 
in between the two super powers, may not remain uncommitted, 
for their security is directly threatened by one or the 
other of the super powers. At the same time, the interests 
of the super powers in Europe are so great that even should 
certain key European states attempt to remain neutral, both 
super powers would exert great pressure upon these states 
to join in an alliance. Other states, such as the African 
states, are able to remain uncommitted both because they do 
not feel directly threatened by either super power, and be - 
cause they do not lie in an area that the super powers re - 
gard as being of strategic importance, and therefore scant 
pressure is brought upon them to conclude an alliance.
It may be noted that even some states which are un - 
committed actually have a tacit backing from one or the 
other of the super powers in case of an emergency involving 
the opposing super power. India provides such an example. 
While uncommitted throughout the 1950*s, there still re - 
mained a tacit assumption that should the Soviet Union, or 
some other Communist state (such as China), attempt
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aggression upon India, then the United States would inter - 
vene on India’s behalf. India was therefore free to 
operate as a state independent of an American alliance, but 
nonetheless protected by the American security shield. In - 
deed the same may be said of any nonaligned state, but with 
less certainty, for the very rivalry of the super powers 
tends to guarantee the independence and integrity of these 
states, even in the absence of a tacit agreement, just as 
Russian and British rivalry insured the independence of 
Afghanistan and Persia in the 19th century.8 Neither super 
power is likely to sit idly by while the other forcibly 
exerts its control over the uncommitted. This is true 
whether the state is in a particularly important region or 
not. In fact, the mere interest of one or the other super 
power in a particular region has the effect of making that 
region important to the other super power, and thus of in - 
suring an interest in the proceedings. Thus, the nonaligned 
states are, in effect, also protected by the super powers. 
Such protection does not, however, extend to conflicts 
between lesser uncommitted states, unless it is suspected 
that such conflict is inspired by a super power.
Among the states that do form alliances with the super
powers, either out of a fear of invasion from one or the 
other of the super powers, or due to their strategic lo - 
cations, there develops a distinct tendency, at least 
during the earliest stages of this relationship, for the 
super power to dominate the policy of the lesser state.
This dominance is in large part a product of the threat 
that the rival super power poses, and to the fact that the 
only guarantee against that threat lies in the alliance 
the lesser state has with its sponsoring super power.
Should this super power threaten to pull out of the al - 
liance, an unlikely possibility as is later realized, then 
the lesser state will become vulnerable. In the event that 
the super power pressured the lesser state into the al - 
liance due to its strategic location, the super power still 
has immense leverage, for the very strategic position of 
the lesser state dictates that both super powers are in - 
terested, and should the alliance be dissolved, then the 
distinct possibility exists that the rival super power 
would rush in to fill the void. Such a possibility ties 
the lesser state to the super power.
The dependence of the lesser states upon super powers 
for a protective umbrella tends to create a tendency for
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alliance systems to transform themselves into blocs. The 
difference between the two lies in the ability of the 
states involved to dissolve the relationship. In an al - 
liance system, all states entering into the agreement are 
given the opportunity to back out of the arrangement, while 
in a bloc system, the lesser states are caught in the orbit 
of a giant whose political, military, and economic pre - 
ponderance may hold them there even against their will.9 
With the development of a two bloc system in which each 
super power has its own orbit of lesser states, the system 
loses much of its flexibility and becomes rather rigid.
The development of the two bloc system does not give 
the super powers total sway over the policies of their 
allies. Although these allies cannot leave their respective 
orbits at their own volition, they can stay there either 
as willing and effective supporters of the policies of the 
super powers or as balky and unreliable captives,10 *phe 
super powers thus attempt to maintain the belief among 
their allies that they merely provide advice, and then only 
when requested, on policy matters. In order to insure that 
their allies do follow the correct line, however, the super 
powers may rely on a number of devices ranging from military
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and trade agreements to ideology and propaganda. Propa - 
ganda is used to portray the activities of the opposition 
as evil and to exhort their allies to rally around in an 
attempt to thwart such designs.
The super powers also seek to influence the policies 
of their allies by using their vast array of technological 
facilities to gather information that is then provided to 
the lesser states to be used in the formation of policy. 
Since policy is a product of one's perception of a particu - 
lar situation, and one's information helps one to perceive 
what is happening, the super powers have great leverage in 
determining what policies their allies will follow, as long 
as their allies are at least partially dependent upon the 
data provided by the super power.
The type of relationship that exists between the 
leader and the rest of the bloc may be characterized as 
either loose or tight.H A loose relationship is one in 
which the goals of the bloc are limited and where dis - 
agreements not affecting these goals are permissible,*2 An 
example may be taken from the Western bloc led by the United 
States. In this bloc, the only overall goal consisted of 
containing Communism. This meant that there was room for
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the discussion of what would be done regarding all other 
questions, and that differences of opinion among bloc m e m ­
bers could be tolerated and would not overly threaten the 
unity of the bloc. Thus, the bloc was stable. On the 
other hand, a bloc may be considered tight if the goals of 
the bloc are not limited, and if the super power has an 
almost unlimited power in determining what policies are to 
be pursued by the members of the bloc.*3 The Communist bloc 
may be seen as an example of a tight system. The goal of 
this bloc is to overwhelm the opposition and to extend 
Communist influence. In the. Communist bloc, the. Soviet 
Union has great discretion in determining what policies 
should be followed throughout the bloc. Such a setup may 
have certain advantages, in that a unity of policy may be 
expected at all times, but it may also be unstable. This 
instability stems from the difficulty the bloc may have in 
meeting its goals and from the resentment felt at the dom - 
inance of the super power. Such far reaching goals are 
difficult to realize, and when not met may tend to create 
disagreement over the methods that ought to be employed in 
their pursuit. One such disagreement developed in the 
Communist camp between the Soviet Union and the Chinese
6k
over whether or not it was advisable to push the Western 
bloc into an armed conflict* At the same time, the lesser 
states in a tight bloc may come to resent the dominance of 
the super power and actually seek to leave the bloc.
Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and China are 
all examples of attempts to escape from the domineering 
influence of the Soviet Union. In a tight bloc, the chance 
is great that the lesser states may be held as captives, 
while in a loose bloc, the lesser states sire far more likely 
to be cooperative and willing members of the bloc. Thus, 
the advantages that may be inherent in a unified policy in 
a tight bloc may be largely lost due to the dissension 
that may develop.
The domination that the super powers enjoy at the 
onset of their alliances with the lesser states that come 
to form their blocs wears thin as time passes. This is 
largely due to a realization on the part of the lesser 
states that the competition between the two super powers 
tends to guarantee that neither super power will abandon a 
recalcitrant ally. In the earliest stages of the formation 
of alliances, the lesser states are overwhelmingly con - 
cerned with enhancing their security as opposed to a
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menacing giant. This may only be done by turning to the 
other giant, providing of course that it appears less men - 
acing. During this time, the lesser states are not fully 
aware of the importance that they may have in such a re - 
lationship, for they are quite understandably concerned 
with protecting themselves. After the initial period of fear 
subsides, however, the lesser states come to recognize 
that they make a contribution to the interests of the super 
power, not perhaps by adding significantly to its fire 
power in the event of a conflict, but rather by providing 
it with a base for operations and with support for its 
policies in a particular region. In addition to this, the 
lesser states find that the intensity of the competition 
between the super powers brings them to regard gains and 
losses in a manner that is not directly proportionate to 
their importance with regard to security. While the loss 
of a particular ally may be of no weighty importance, the 
super powers, due to their intense competition, come to 
regard any loss at all as virtually intolerable. The super 
powers therefore jealously guard their allies, attempting 
to keep them in the fold. This, of course, brings the 
allies to believe that they need not follow their leader's
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position in all matters and eventually helps to create the 
stirrings of independence among the lesser states.
Such a growing desire for independence may have a pro - 
found effect upon the stability of the bloc system, and 
particularly upon the tight bloc. The tight bloc is 
founded and developed upon the explicit leadership and 
control of the super power, a situation in which the iden - 
tity of the various states in the bloc is somewhat sub - 
merged in favor of bloc unity. A movement toward greater 
identity and independence for the lesser states has the 
effect of undermining the very basis upon which the bloc 
structure is built. Independence on the part of the states 
in the tight bloc comes as a direct challenge to the 
authority and leadership of the bloc leader, and whenever 
successful, not only means a diminished role for the super 
power, but also provides competition for the leader of the 
bloc.
The effect of greater independence for the lesser 
states in a loose bloc, on the other hand, is not nearly so 
divisive. This is largely due to the fact that the loose 
bloc is not built so much upon dominance as it is upon co - 
operation. A move for greater independence on the part of
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the lesser states in the bloc does not come as a direct 
challenge to the authority of the super power, and there - 
fore, in itself, does, not threaten the stability of the 
bloc. In comparing the effects of growing independence 
upon the stability of blocs, one may examine the movement 
by China and France for independence. China, as a member 
of a tight bloc, posed a serious threat to bloc unity when 
making a move for more independence. Indeed, China is 
viewed as a legitimate competitor with the Soviet Union 
for the allegiance of the states in the bloc. France’s 
move for independence, on the other hand, has hardly had 
the effect of creating a competitor for the United States 
in the role of bloc leader. This is largely because the 
United States, as leader of the Western bloc, has never 
explicitly sought to maintain an air of infallibility and 
of total dominance. Thus, a movement for greater independence 
by a state in the bloc was not a direct challenge to 
American leadership, but was little more than a glancing 
blow (i.e. complaints were that consultation among allies 
had not been complete enough, not that there was a total 
lack of cooperation and consultation).
In the loose bloc, these problems may be dealt with
short of main force by reforming somewhat the structure of 
the alliance and allowing for greater participation by the 
lesser states in the formation of policy. Even with such 
reforms, the super power may at times act capriciously, or 
events may preclude prior consultation. In such a bloc, 
however, a premium is placed upon negotiation and compro - 
mise among allies, rather than merely upon coercion (though 
force may be used at times).
The tight bloc, on the other hand, built as it is upon 
compulsion, is kept in line through coercion. Movements 
by lesser states for greater,independence and a larger role 
in decision - making are viewed as being akin to treason 
and are put down forcibly where it is possible to do so, 
though it is not always possible. The Soviet Union was able 
to invade Czechoslovakia and force compliance with its 
wishes in 1968 but has found that it has not been possible 
to do so in China, Yugoslavia, or Albania.
This is one factor that causes the "tight” super power 
to be far more conservative in its policies than may 
otherwise be the_case, for it must not only keep a watchful 
eye upon the opposing camp, but it must also look out that 
its own camp does not attempt to revolt and declare itself
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free of the tight bloc. Thus, a super power in a loose bloc 
may feel freer and may engage in a more adventuristic 
foreign policy than a super power leading a tight bloc.
C. THE MANUAL SYSTEM 
A manually operated bipolar system is ambiguous, for 
the super powers become conscious of the system within 
which they exist and seek to manipulate this system in 
order to enhance their security, while at the same time 
keeping in reserve their own power in order that it might 
serve as an ultimate guarantee of this security. The am - 
biguity is found in the fact that this may create a new 
willingness for compromise and cooperation between the big 
two, while at the same time they remain very wary of one 
another. In the manual system, one does not necessarily 
find a high degree of trust, for the system continues to be 
built upon distrust, as is the automatic system. Nor does 
one find a convergence of ideological systems, for both 
super powers retain their faith in the correctness of their 
view of the nature of things. What one does find is that 
the super powers have come to realize that the fierce com - 
petition found in an automatic system is bound to end in a 
devastating war and that the only manner in which to avoid
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such a conflict lies in cooperation between the super 
powers to the extent that the bipolar system is preserved 
and kept free from w a r . ^  The super powers realize that a 
continued competition for the total domination of the 
system will result only in the destruction of both the 
system and the states within the system - with no one a 
victor. They come to believe that their security is en - 
hanced when the system functions smoothly, with as little 
tension as possible.
This does not mean that conflicts disappear entirely, 
or that the super powers cease to have differences that 
result in tension. Contagious competition remains, for 
the super powers continue to feel that they cannot allow 
themselves to fall behind the other in strength, for if 
this should occur, there is small possibility of redressing 
the imbalance through an alliance with another state. It 
does mean, however, that such competition is toned down and 
that there are negotiations to limit it as far as it is 
possible to do so. The super powers find that they must 
weigh carefully the consequences of their actions and that 
they must refuse to act capriciously, for conflicts are 
more easily avoided when one knows what to expect from the
other side.
The super powers also seek to regulate conflicts 
between lesser states, whether they are members of a bloc, 
or unaligned. These conflicts are regulated in order that 
they will not get so far out of hand as to endanger the 
interests of one of the super powers, tempting it to inter 
vene, creating the spectacle of a super power confrontation 
Regulation of these conflicts is through political and 
economic means. The super powers may come to an agreement 
between themselves, seeking to impose it upon the states 
involved, or they may act as referees in bringing the 
disputing parties together to reach a settlement. Econ - 
oxnic sanctions may be imposed by the super powers if the 
lesser states refuse to halt their hostilities. The use 
of military power, however, would remain largely out of 
the question, for it could all too easily lead to that 
which the super powers seek to avoid - a confrontation.
Coercion in a manually operated system may rely more 
upon economic tools than upon any others, for this allows 
the super powers to resort to a form of pressure that 
deeply affects the offending states, while helping to avoid 
the possibilities of a military confrontation. Such a
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coercive device, however, calls for cooperation between 
the super powers and other lesser states not involved in 
the conflict, if it is to be effective. That the existence 
of the system may appear to be at issue may well induce 
such cooperation.
The super powers are also likely to resort to economic 
means when attempting to coerce each other* This may be 
done by withholding from sale particular technological 
items (such as computers) that the other side desperately 
wishes to obtain, or by refusing to develop certain re - 
sources that the other side is known to need and want. In 
fact, economic development may well be a contributing 
factor in the development of a manual system, for the super 
powers may eventually find that they have reached a point 
of economic development from which they may progress but 
slowly without securing the trade and technical assistance 
of the other.*5
In the manual system, cooperation between the super 
powers dictates that the use of propaganda, quite prevalent 
in the automatic system, be curtailed, for it serves to 
stress the differences between the camps and to maintain a 
high degree of tension. This may give the appearance of a
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convergence of ideological views. This, however, is an 
illusion.16 There is an acceptance of the immediate need 
for a coexistence of systems, but each side maintains a 
belief that in the long run, its own ideological system 
will prevail. This final victory, being inevitable, need 
not be rushed toward, and violent means need not be used in 
order to realize it. Each side, having attempted an ideo - 
logical storming of the other's position through the use 
of propaganda, in effect settles down for a long siege, 
confident of final victory.
The development of a manual system has an effect upon 
the relationship between the super powers and the lesser 
states within the system. In a loose bloc, there may be an 
initial period of apprehension on the part of the lesser 
states. This is due to the fear that negotiations between 
the super powers may result in an agreement affecting their 
security.*7 This may cause these states to press for a re - 
affirmation of their alliances with the leader, and for an 
assurance that they will be protected in the event of ag - 
gression by the other super power. Increased consultation, 
especially before and after negotiations involving the super 
powers, would be called for in order that the lesser states
might feel that they were given an opportunity to express 
their views regarding the questions being discussed.
After the passing of the initial apprehension, the 
lesser stateq in a loose bloc would be likely to realize 
that they could play a far greater role in the operation of 
the manual system than they had at first felt. This role 
would largely consist of either going along with agree - 
ments between the super powers, or playing the role of a 
"spoiler,” thus making it difficult for the super powers to 
put certain agreements into effect. This realization 
could well lead the lesser states to demand a partnership 
with the super powers, perhaps not on equal terms, and 
perhaps not as a negotiator at all high level meetings in - 
volving the two, but at least as interested parties with a 
veto power over particular sections of any agreements 
reached. Thus, the lesser states in a loose bloc could be 
expected to gain a greater control over the operation of 
the system in a manual system.
In a tight bloc, the lesser states would be less 
likely to experience an initial period of fear at the 
prospect of negotiations between the super powers, for 
these states already exist in a position in which their
security largely lies in the hands of their leader. These 
states would be much more likely to follow the negotiations 
with the hope that perhaps they would result in a loosening 
of the system, as would most likely occur. The tight 
system would be prone to loosen somewhat due to the 
development of cooperation between the super powers, 
largely because the leader would be engaged in a game of 
such high stakes - that of securing cooperation with the 
other super power, that it would be reluctant to endanger 
the negotiations by attempting to impose its will too 
stringently upon its satellites, thereby raising the sus - 
picions and perhaps even the moral indignation of the other 
super power. The leader in a tight bloc, however, could 
be expected to maintain a close watch over its satellites 
in order to insure that they would not stray too far from 
the accepted course of action, issuing terse warnings to 
those that appeared on the verge of doing so.
Unaligned states in a manual system would be likely to 
find greater difficulty in playing the super powers against 
each other than in the automatic system. This would be due 
to the increased cooperation between the super powers that 
would result in agreements that would largely dictate a
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hands off policy with regard to these states, except in 
the event that a war among them would dictate a need to 
lead the way in reaching a settlement of the conflict.
This would mean that the super powers would be less likely 
to compete with each other in giving aid to these states 
in order to obtain their support, and that these states 
would have to petition the super powers for such support. 
These states would also be less able to act with impunity 
towards one of the super powers, for the assistance of the 
other super power that they would receive in the automatic 
system would no longer be a certainty, and there would be 
a chance that the super powers would reach an agreement 
detrimental to the interests of the offending state in 
such a circumstance. Thus, the unaligned states would 
find that in a manually operated system, they would have 
less influence than in an automatic system, unless they 
possessed some resource (such as oil) that made them im - 
portant to the interests of the super powers.
In summary, one may state that a bipolar system, 
whether it is automatic or manual, consists of two classes 
of states* the super powers and the lesser states. These 
states pursue policies that are designed to accumulate
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power in order that their security may be enhanced. This 
desire for security results in a competition among these 
states which is dominated by the super powers and which has 
a contagious nature. In the automatic system, the super 
powers compete with almost every means at their disposal to 
dominate the system. In a manual system, competition 
between the big two remains, but it is regulated somewhat 
in an effort to avoid a conflict that might plunge the en - 
tire system into an abysmal war that could well spell the 
destruction of all states within the system.
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CHAPTER III 
A COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS 
A. THE AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS
In examining a balance of power system together with 
a bipolar system, one is led to conclude that variations in 
the operations of the two systems are traceable to the 
different numbers of essential actors (states whose be - 
havior affects all other members of the system) in each 
system. In a balance of power system this number is no 
fewer than three, while in a bipolar system there are only 
two essential actors. The conclusion that it is the number 
of states, rather than any other single factor, that causes 
the systems to vary, may be arrived at by determining that 
structurally, the systems are similar to one another in 
every manner save one - number of dominating states.
Both a balance of power system and a bipolar system 
consist of independent states, free of the controlling 
direction of a superior body, holding control over their 
own power and policy. In both systems this lack of 
direction from a central agency places the responsibility 
for the maintenance of independence upon the individual
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states in the system. In such a situation, these states 
are prone to feel very insecure lest encroachments by 
another state should deprive them of portions of their 
territory, and perhaps even of their very identity. In 
order to insure that this will not happen, the states in 
both systems seek to develop and increase their strength 
in order that a display of such strength can deter possible 
attacks from others. This development of strength may be 
a part of one of two processes, as a result of one's efforts 
to add to one's own national power, or by concluding an 
alliance with another state that will add the power of 
that state to one's own. In such a way, each state may 
hope that it will, as a minimum goal, be able to prevent 
the rise of any other state to a position of hegemony.
It is at this point, however, that one discovers a 
difference between the two systems. In a balance of power 
system, all states are capable of forming meaningful al - 
liances, that is, alliances that may add significantly to 
their own strength, while in a bipolar system, one finds 
that this is not the case. The lesser states in a bipolar 
system may conclude such an alliance, either among them - 
selves in an effort to offset the strength of some other
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lesser state, or with one of the super powers in an attempt 
to safeguard themselves from threats that the other super 
power may pose. The super powers, however, do not have 
such an option, for there are no states with whom they can 
ally that would add significantly to their power vis £i vis 
the opposing super power. For the super powers, alliances 
with other states can at hest merely improve the striking 
position of each with regard to the other super power, but 
not its actual strength (I am assuming that the super 
powers are economically self - sufficient). An alliance 
with a lesser state may also improve a super power's 
ability to control a particular region, but again this does 
not improve its actual military strength with regard to the 
opposing super power, and hence may add little to its per - 
ceived security.
This difference between the two systems with regard to 
the ability of the dominating states (which shall be desig 
nated in this discussion as great powers in a balance of 
power system and as super powers in a bipolar system) to 
conclude alliances to improve their actual power with re - 
gard to one another is a direct result of the variance in 
the number of actors in each system. It has been determined
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that a bipolar system may have two distinct classes of 
states - the super powers, and the lesser states. A balance 
of power system may also have two such classes - the great 
powers, and other, lesser states. In the balance of power 
system, however, one finds that the lesser states are, much 
as in a bipolar system, free to conclude alliances among 
themselves in an effort to counter other lesser states, 
and at the same time to attach themselves to the appropriate 
great power, or powers, in an effort to prevent their dom - 
ination by another great power, Yet, it is not only the 
lesser states in a balance of power system that may do 
this, but also the great powers that may conclude such 
meaningful alliances to add significantly to their power, 
not perhaps with the lesser states, but certainly with 
other great powers. Even when the number of great powers
is as low as three, it is possible for two of the three to
form an alliance in order to check the advances of the
third great power when it threatens to dominate the system.*
With an increase in the number of great powers, the pos - 
sible combinations and alliances also increase. Such an 
opportunity has great implications with regard to the op - 
eration of the system, contributing to the differences
8^
that arise between the systems.
In considering the possible alliances in both a balance 
of power system and a bipolar system, it may well clarify 
later discussion if one attempts to attach a specific name 
to the types of alliances found in each system. Two types 
of alliances shall be said to exist, positional and power 
(these designations being chosen for no particular reason).
A positional alliance shall be defined as one in which a 
state is able to improve its position with regard to a 
possible attack upon an opponent, but where no substantial 
power is added to the dominant state’s array of strength.
In such an alliance, the weaker of the states forming the 
alliance, of course, does add a great deal to its own power 
and prestige. An example of such an alliance is the Soviet 
alliance with Cuba, in which the Soviet Union was able to 
gain a potential site for an attack upon the United States, 
but gained no strength. At the same time, Cuba added much 
to its own prestige. A power alliance, on the other hand, 
is one in which all states involved add to their power as 
a result of the alliance. In such an alliance, it is also 
possible that a state may obtain a more favorable position 
with regard to a potential opponent. One may quite rightly
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point out that other types of alliances do exist, but they
shall not be dealt with here.
The concept of a positional alliance carries with it 
the implication that one must know precisely who one’s op - 
ponent or opponents are, or will be, before being able to 
go about seeking such an alliance. It is, of course, quite 
convenient if the identity of the state or states against 
whom one wishes to gain the advantage of position were to 
remain stable over a long period of time. Without such 
stability, it could become inconceivable that one would 
wish to engage in such alliances, since they would add 
nothing to one's striking power and would indeed return 
little, for a state has little use for a positional al - 
liance unless it actually foresees the possibility of 
needing to use the position gained for an actual strike. 
This type of alliance, therefore, would hardly be of use
to states engaging in a mere quarrel, but with no in -
tention of going to war. Nor would a positional alliance 
be particularly useful if a state or states felt it 
necessary to forestall possible aggression on the part of 
another state. In such a situation, a power alliance would 
be called for, as it would allow the states involved to
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demonstrate their collection of actual power.
A positional alliance is best suited to situations in 
which there are two states more or less convinced that they 
must live in opposition to one another for at least the 
foreseeable future. In such a case, the two states may be 
warranted in seeking to gain a favorable position for a 
possible attack upon the opponent, for one knows well that 
any conflict will most likely be with this particular op - 
ponent, and preparations for such a conflict might prudently 
include an alliance that contains the advantage of position. 
The conditions for the use of a positional alliance are 
quite readily met by a bipolar system, for in it there are 
two super powers poised against each other, knowing that 
any war that is fought will be fought between them.
In a balance of power system these are not always 
present. A balance of power system may contain three or 
more states, with each state holding no special animosity 
toward any other specific state. In such a situation, a 
positional alliance would not be of particular use, except 
in the event of an impending conflict, for the states in 
the system would find that those they were gaining 
positional advantage over in a dispute today could well be
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tomorrow's potential allies. There is the possibility in 
a balance of power system, however, that two particular 
states may come to believe that they are irreconcilable 
enemies (such a development could well lead to the mal - 
functioning of the system should another state rise in 
power and go unchecked due to such views), as did France 
and Germany from the latter part of the nineteenth century 
until the end of World War II, When this occurs, then 
positional alliances may well come to play a definite role 
in the foreign policies of these states. One may note that 
Bismarck used such alliances against France in the nine - 
teenth century, and that France sought a favorable position 
as opposed to Germany when concluding the alliances that 
formed the ’Little Entente” after World War I. In such a 
situation, however, one may conclude that the two states 
involved have resolved to play what may be seen as a double 
game - at the same time engaging in the operation of a 
balance of power system, while attempting to pursue favor - 
able policies with regard to one another. Thus, these two 
states may be ready and willing to work with other states 
(but not each other) in the balance of power system to 
halt attempts at hegemony on the part of any state, while
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operating a bipolar system between themselves, competing 
for position and power with one another.
There are certain problems associated with the in - 
ability of the super powers in a bipolar world to conclude 
power alliances that do not occur in a balance of power 
system where there is a sufficient number of states to 
allow such combinations. One such problem is that the 
policy makers of the super powers come to have little con - 
fidence that a disturbed equilibrium will be able to right 
itself, for there are no states with whom they may ally in 
order to counter any increase in strength on the part of 
the other super power,2 This causes the leaders of both 
super powers anxiety lest they should fall behind their 
opponent in some critical area of national power and leads 
to a contagious competition between the super powers.
Such competition does not develop in a balance of power 
system, except under extreme circumstances - such as when 
the great powers divide themselves into two opposing 
alliances, giving the system bipolar characteristics, as 
occurred just prior to World War I.
Contagious competition fails to develop in a normally 
functioning balance of power system primarily for two
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reasons: the states in the system have the opportunity to
form power alliances in order to counter any state that may 
threaten to.attain hegemony, and the larger number of 
states, each pursuing its own particular formula in search 
of additional power, makes it more difficult for any in - 
dividual state to determine which states to watch carefully 
and imitate to some extent. In a balance of power system, 
one may find states (such as Great Britain) that devote 
large parts of their energies to maintaining a vast navy, 
and others (such as France and Germany) that attempt to 
maintain large armies. Each state quite rightly pursues 
that particular path to strength that best suits it, and it 
is rare to find a state that is capable of devoting enough 
resources to all such activities as to keep pace with all 
others. The sheer number of states with which to keep up 
militates strongly against contagious competition, and even 
should one state seek to engage in an attempt to keep up 
(as did Germany prior to World War I, at least to some ex - 
tent), if the other states in the system do not take a 
reciprocal course, then contagious competition, as opposed 
to regular competition (which may be defined as a situation 
in which the states in the system compete with one another
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in the development of power, hut where this competition 
does not necessarily involve imitation), does not develop* 
The development of a contagious competition in a 
bipolar system leads the super powers to view their rela - 
tionship with one another in zero - sum terms, with a gain 
for one side seen as an absolute loss for the other, and 
vice versa* In such a situation, both super powers become 
very wary regarding the motives behind the actions of the 
opponent. Should one of the super powers develop an 
interest in this or that state or region, no matter how far 
it may be removed from the center of the conflict between
the super powers, then the other super power is more than
likely to express an interest also, lest it may find it -
self at a disadvantage due to some esoteric advantage that
may befall the opponent* In such a situation, it becomes 
very difficult, in fact nearly impossible, to deflect the 
passions of conflicts between the super powers to the 
periphery in some far off area, where the vital interests 
of neither super power may be involved, for both super 
powers come to believe that their vital interests are in - 
volved in any area where either expresses an i n t e r e s t .3 
In a balance of power system, however, the larger
91
number of great powers involved in the operation of the 
system tends to provide for the opportunity to deflect 
certain competition to the periphery, with conflicts 
arising out of this competition remaining somewhat apart 
from those a.rising in the system itself. One may take the 
nineteenth century European system as an example. Certain 
competitive passions were allowed by the states within the 
system to vent themselves in a race for colonial territories 
abroad. This allowed each state within the system to expand 
into areas where none of the other states felt they had any 
particularly vital interests, areas such as Asia and 
Africa. Each state was able to expand on the periphery, 
but in the closely watched areas of Europe, where all felt 
they had vital interests at stake, there was no room for 
such expansion. It is true that at times two states might 
come almost to blows over this colonial expansion, as did 
Great Britain and France during the Fashoda crisis, but 
these moments were easily overcome when problems within 
the balance of power system itself demanded greater coop - 
eration. Thus, within ten years after the Fashoda crisis, 
the situation in Europe demanded that the former potential 
enemies, Great Britain and France, begin talks leading to
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an entente in order that they might jointly oppose German 
power.
This may lead one to conclude that while the states in 
a balance of power system tend towards a zero - sum view 
of the system itself, there are areas outside the system in 
which they may be prone to accept a nonconstant - sum view 
of conditions. While no state in the nineteenth century 
European system was allowed to expand unopposed v/ithin the 
system itself, for this would lead to an increase in power 
thus disturbing the existing distribution of power, ex - 
pansion outside of the system was possible, for it was 
believed that it would not greatly affect the distribution 
of power within the system. Reinforcing this conclusion 
is the fact that the great powers in the nineteenth century 
actually cooperated with one another in nonconstant - sum 
fashion to divide China up into spheres of influence in 
order that the development of colonial possessions there 
would be easier. A bipolar system, on the other hand, due 
to the contagious competition that exists between the 
super powers, tends to foster a zero - sum view not only 
of events and territory at the center of the contention 
between the super powers, but also,with regard to any
areas, at any distance from the system, where either super 
power indicates an interest.
Another factor associated with the contagious com - 
petition inherent in a bipolar system, but not found in an 
optimally set up balance of power system, is ideological 
controversy. Ideology as a tool used in the search for 
power, whether used cynically in an effort to dupe those 
in one’s own state and in other states into supporting 
one’s actions, or genuinely advanced as a value system 
that one believes in, plays a role in a bipolar world. As 
discussed earlier, the resort to the ideological tool tends 
to be a result of the contagious competition between the 
two super powers, in which the super powers both come to 
advance the belief that they are "correct" in their 
particular efforts to control and oppose the other ”in - 
correct” super power. The development of an ideology to 
be adhered to by each super power is a part of a process 
of explaining why each feels it is correct and outlining 
the world that each would hope to create, should it have 
the opportunity to do so. This ideal world, one might call 
it a Utopia, is then held out to the rest of the world as 
a promise of a better future.
9^
In a balance of power system, two factors, the absence 
of contagious competition, and the need to be free of any 
constraints that could serve to block the shifting of al - 
liances inherent in the system, militate against the 
development of state ideologies. Where such ideologies do 
develop, they tend to disrupt the operation of the system.**' 
Ideological fervor is not likely to develop as a result of 
the functioning of a balance of power system due to the 
number of states within the system, some of whom may be 
allies at one point in time, and opponents at another.
One must, of course, realize that the people and leaders 
of states, at almost all times, tend to believe themselves 
to be pursuing the right course. This is true in both a 
balance of power system and in a bipolar system. In a 
balance of power system this belief does not, however, 
necessarily develop into an ideological crusade simply be - 
cause such a crusade needs an opponent, and in a balance of 
power system no particular opponent is always readily 
available (except if a state - such as Revolutionary 
France - wishes to take on the rest of the system). It is 
difficult to imagine France indulging in a truly ideo - 
logical vendetta against Great Britain in I898 over Fashoda,
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knowing that the rising power of Germany could force the 
two states into an alliance within a short period of time. 
In a balance of power system no particular state can 
actually afford to attack any other particular state in a 
continually passionate manner that an ideological struggle 
tends to call for, because it realizes that at some point 
in the future it may need the assistance of that very state 
to forestall the ambitions of another rival, and the 
emotions of such an assault make the attainment of such 
help all the more difficult. In fact, one is only able to 
discover an example of emotional and ideological passion 
in the unreal balance of power system depicted in George 
Orwell’s 1984. where the state’s total control over the 
populace allowed it to cause them to forget that today’s 
ally was just yesterday depicted in the foulest of terms,
In the real world of balance of power politics reliance is 
placed more upon the concrete realities of power politics 
than upon the abstractions of ideology that one finds in a 
bipolar system. In fact, one need only examine the op - 
eration of the European system in the 1930*s to see pre - 
cisely how ideological differences may be relegated to the 
periphery as one is able to review the manner in which the
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Soviet Union came to conclude an alliance with a state - 
Germany - whose ideological allegiances were exactly 
counter to those in the U.S.S.R.
Contagious competition between the super powers in a 
bipolar system has effects upon the alliances formed in 
that system, causing them to develop a rigidity that 
transforms them from alliances - from which all parties 
may escape - into blocs, from which escape is difficult, if 
at all possible. In a bipolar system each super power 
seeks to obtain alliances with lesser states, particularly 
those lesser states located in key regions, or in positions 
from which it would be easier to strike at the other super 
power. In obtaining these alliances, the super powers are 
guided by a zero - sum perception of the system, hoping 
that each new state that falls into line will help them 
obtain an advantage over the opponent. Once these lesser 
states have entered into an alliance with one of the super 
powers, each super power seeks to hold them in place in 
the alliance out of the fear that to lose any particular 
ally from its orbit would be virtually the same as a gain 
for the opposing super power, even if it did not join the 
other bloc.
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For their part, the lesser states in a bipolar world 
find that the only manner in which they may gain a reason - 
able degree of security is to ally themselves with the 
super power that is perceived as being the less threatening, 
or the more friendly. Once they have entered into an
agreement, explicit or implicit, with a super power, these
states develop a fear of leaving the security of such a
relationship, particularly since this may expose them to
the revenge of the other super power. There develops out 
of this situation a tendency in a bipolar system for al - 
liances to become permanent entities from which the lesser 
states are afraid to attempt to escape, and which the 
super powers fear to dissolve due to a desire not to lose 
position with regard to the opponent. These alliances 
develop into blocs with all members more or less permanently 
fixed under the supervision of the respective super power.
In a balance of power system, however, such is not 
the case. Here one finds the great powers continually 
maneuvering among themselves for position, with each having 
as its minimum goal that the system should not be dominated 
by any particular state - unless that state happens to be 
itself. In such a situation, the great powers are unable
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to conclude permanent alliances, for there is the possibil - 
ity that any of those with whom one may ally at one point 
in time to block the rise of a particular state, may at 
another time threaten to dominate the system itself. One 
finds that in the operation of the system in Europe in the 
twenty years after World War I that certain states, Great 
Britain among them, came to experience a certain uneasiness 
that France was on the verge of dominating the system in 
the 1920*s. In this situation, the British felt compelled 
to refuse to support the French on particular occasions in 
an effort to prevent hegemony (although no alliance was ever 
concluded). Yet, within fifteen years, the British found 
themselves allied with the French, as each state sought to 
counter the rise of Nazi Germany. Such shifts In a balance 
of power system are common and tend to make alliances and 
understandings among the great powers fail to take on the 
characteristics and permanence needed for a bloc to develop.
Lesser states in a balance of power system also are 
not likely to be sucked into blocs formed by the great 
powers. This is because alliances in a balance of power 
system are generally concluded in the desire to obtain 
greater power, and an alliance with a lesser state would
not fit this purpose. Great powers are not likely to seek 
alliances with lesser states merely in an effort to obtain 
sway over these states unless these states are located in 
key positions. In such a case, however, the interests of 
several great powers would be concerned, and these particu - 
lar lesser states would most likely be placed in a position 
of neutrality, under the dominance of no great power, as 
were the low countries in Western Europe in the European 
balance of power system before both the first and second 
World Wars. A great power may seek to create a cordon 
sanitaire out of lesser states about it, as Russian rulers 
have tried to do in Eastern Europe for years, but even this 
does not reflect the characteristics of a bloc, for it is 
created for specific defensive purposes and does not seek 
to include states far from the interested great power's 
borders.
Despite the fact that a balance of power system 
operates best when the states within it are able to main - 
tain a degree of mobility with regard to the formation of 
alliances, there are occasions upon which the system breaks 
up into two rather inflexible groups of states in opposing 
alliances. As Duverger points out, when writing of similar
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tendencies in political parties, such instances are usually 
the result of the development of a crisis.5 Such a dif - 
ficulty in a balance of power system could well arise out 
of attempts on the part of one of its members to dominate 
the system. In making such a move, the state with ex - 
pansionist motives would be likely to seek the support of 
other states in its quest, forming an alliance with these 
states. In so doing, the alarm may be sounded for the rest 
of the system by the balancer (or balancers) who perceives 
the danger and hopes to avoid the domination of the system 
by setting up a league of defense. In such a crisis, all 
members of the system are faced with choosing between one 
of the two sides, creating, for a time, a pseudo - bipolar 
system. The system does not retain these bipolar features 
for long, however, for the issue most likely is resolved 
either as a result of defections from alliances, forcing 
one side to back down, or as a result of war.
A balance of power system may also develop bipolar 
characteristics as a result of a clash between two states 
within the system, each of which regards the other as a 
permanent foe (as did Germany and France in the European 
system from 1870 to the end of World War II). In this
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case, it is likely that the system may have had latent 
bipolar tendencies prior to the eruption as each of the 
two primary contestants most probably will have sought to 
accumulate the support of potential allies in the event of 
a conflict. The division of Europe into two armed camps 
on the eve of World War I followed this course, as both 
Germany and France sought to enlist the other states in 
the European system in tacit alliances that gave the system 
unseen bipolar characteristics. When a conflict arose, the 
two alliance structures emerged to confront one another, 
and war resulted. In the optimal operation of a balance 
of power system, however, such latent bipolarity is avoided, 
for flexibility is the fabric out of which the system is 
made.
It should be pointed out that while a balance of power 
system may tend toward bipolarity in a time of crisis, as 
these occasions pass, the system reverts to multipolarity, 
and flexibility reappears. Such was the case at the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars, when the European system again 
functioned without two alliance systems in opposition to 
one another. After World War I one also sees this pattern, 
with some flexibility appearing in the system until the
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eve of World War II, when the crisis of Hitler’s demands 
again brought about a break - up of the system into two 
armed camps.
In the contagious competition found in a bipolar 
system, one is able to detect a tendency to move toward 
extremes not found in a balance of power system.^ This is 
due to the absence of any state that has the stature to 
act as a mediator between the two hostile super powers, to 
the ease with which each super power is able to calculate 
the power which may be arrayed against it on any particular 
occasion, and to the need of each super power to match and 
surpass, if possible, the strength of its opponent in an 
effort to insure its security. Examining the last reason 
first, one finds that in the pursuit of power each super 
power may be prone to resort to almost any tactics that 
may be helpful in attaining this end. Such tactics may in - 
elude the fanning of a people’s emotions through the resort 
to either ideological or nationalistic appeals. Ideology 
is used to portray one's own cause as just and as promising 
a better future to the rest of the world, while 
nationalistic appeals are used in seeking to guarantee to 
particular groups in the bipolar system that their identity
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is important to the sponsoring super power. In using these 
appeals, both super powers play, whether cynically or out 
of a genuine concern, upon the emotions of those concerned 
in a manner not usually found in a balance of power system 
(although one may find such emotionalism in a balance of 
power system wrought by conflict into two opposing camps - 
witness World War I in which the allies sought to portray 
•the German troops as Huns invading from the east). Such 
emotionalism tends to be limited in the operation of a 
balance of power system, as has been stated earlier, due to 
the need by all states concerned to be free to realign 
themselves whenever a crisis develops In which one state 
threatens hegemony. The emotionalism engendered by ideology 
and excessive nationalism militates against this.
The super powers not only make use of emotionalism in 
their search for power, but they grasp at any weapon or 
weapons system that may come into being, conducting a tire - 
less search for ever new methods of conducting wars against 
one another. One may point out that the great powers are 
also likely to engage in such a search, but theirs is at 
least partially tempered by the realization that an al - 
liance with other states is an option in the event that one
state may leap ahead of all the others, while in a bipolar 
system such an option does not exist, forcing the super 
powers to one extreme after another in their search for 
ever greater power in order to guarantee their security. 
Thus, the search for military power in a contest between 
the super powers may quickly become divorced from security 
considerations, with power being accumulated for the sake 
of having power. In a balance of power system, on the 
other hand, a great power is more likely to tie power to 
security concerns, for here the possibility of defensive 
alliances helps create a sensation of security through 
numbers.
The ease with which a super power may calculate the 
array of strength of its opponent on any particular oc - 
casion and at any point in the system serves to force the 
super powers to extremes. On the one hand, the knowledge 
of almost exactly how much strength the sole opponent 
possesses tends to create in each super power the desire 
to hedge somewhat by having just a bit more in any particu 
lar area. Such hedging by both sides soon pushes the race 
for strength to extremes. In a balance of power system, 
where there is no certain knowledge at any point in time
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prior to a conflict as to the precise identity of one's 
opponents, such hedging is not very possible, for no great 
power is able to determine the amount of strength that must 
be accumulated to overcome a potential rival, or group of 
rivals. Given that the great powers are of approximately 
equal strength, it is not possible for any one of them to 
seek to match the strength of all possible rivals - to do 
so would mean attempting to be as strong as the whole of 
the system combined, which is out of the reach of any of 
the great powers, or else it would dominate the system, and 
there would be no balance of power system.
The knowledge of very nearly exactly how much strength 
the opposing super power possesses at any given point in the 
system, on the other hand, may tempt a super power to 
resort to the extreme of war by attacking at a weak point, 
either directly, using its own forces, or indirectly, 
using the forces of a satellite. An example of such action 
is the Korean offensive in 1950 in which a Soviet satellite 
appeared to probe at a weak point in the American defensive 
armor in an effort to achieve a fait accompli by occupying 
South Korea before the United States could react to sup - 
port the South Korean forces. Such an extreme move can
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only be resorted to with relative safety when one is fairly 
sure of the weakness that one’s opponent possesses in a 
particular area. In a balance of power system, such a 
calculation is not easily made, for no great power that 
wishes to move against what appears to be a weak link in 
another great power's armor can be assured that in so doing 
it will not call into effect some secret protocol that 
would array against it an impressive force.
Negotiation and compromise are needed if one is to 
avoid a resort to extremes. In a bipolar world, the op - 
portunities for negotiations leading to compromises between 
the super powers are poorer than are those in a balance of 
power system. This is due to the absence of any state 
with the stature to act as a mediator, to the ideological 
differences between the super powers, and to the zero - sum 
view that the super powers have not only of areas central 
to the conflict between them, but of peripheral areas as 
well. The absence of a third state to act as a broker in 
negotiations between the two super powers makes it difficult 
for the super powers to negotiate at all, for there is no 
one to help get them to a conference table together. Even 
should the super powers make the attempt to bargain between
themselves, it is quite difficult to reach an agreement 
without an interested third party to help iron over dif - 
ferences, to propose compromises on sticky issues, and to 
add the weight of its own power to any agreements that may 
be reached. In a balance of power system, however, one 
finds that the larger number of states tends to allow one 
or another of the states in the system to act as a mediator 
in disputes. One may examine the role that Great Britain 
played so effectively in the nineteenth century system to 
see how helpful her role was in resolving disputes within 
the system, most notably between France and Germany. The 
fact that Great Britain had sufficient power to play the 
role of an operator in the system helped to prevent any 
state from resorting to extremes over any particular issue 
and aided in the search for compromises short of war.
The ideological differences between the super powers 
serve to stave off the possibility of compromise between 
them due to the belief on the part of each that the other 
represents "incorrect” views and therefore is not to be 
bargained with. In such a situation each comes to believe 
that even the slightest concession to the other is un *- 
thinkable. Without concessions on small issues, the
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possibility of an agreement encompassing more important 
differences is lost. The lack of such ideological dif - 
ferences in an optimally set up balance of power system, 
on the other hand, makes it far easier to negotiate, for 
each state concerns itself more with the concrete issues 
of power politics than with the lofty and abstract con - 
siderations of ideology.
The zero - sum view that the super powers share re - 
garding not only the central portions of a bipolar system, 
but peripheral areas as well also makes it difficult to 
compromise. Such a view makes it virtually impossible to 
satisfy a super power’s appetite by allowing it to digest 
certain peripheral areas, thus appeasing it and keeping it 
from pressing claims closer to home. This arrangement is
not possible because it is not possible to uncover any
area, peripheral or otherwise, that either super power would 
be likely to declare it was willing to allow the other to
take, for all points on the globe become of vital concern
to a super power as soon as the other super power declares 
an interest. In a balance of power system, however, one 
finds the opportunity to achieve compromises by deflecting 
passions to the periphery, as was discussed earlier.
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B. THE MANUAL SYSTEMS 
The primary difference between a manual balance of 
power system and a manual bipolar system is that in the 
former the policy makers of the essential actors develop 
an understanding of the theoretical framework upon which 
the system is built and attempt to institutionalize the 
system itself, while in the latter the statesmen directing 
the super powers do not so much wish to institutionalize the 
system as they desire to avoid a conflict that could result 
in a catastrophic war. This difference may again be at - 
tributed to the variance in the number of essential actors 
found in each system. In a balance of power system, with 
its larger number of essential actors, a state may feel 
reasonably secure if it is assured that no one state will 
be allowed to rise to a position of hegemony. If no state 
is allowed to gain a significantly larger share of strength 
than is possessed by any other state within the system, 
then it is felt that it will be deterred from committing 
aggression and threatening the security of others by the 
belief that its strength employed in such an effort will 
be opposed by equal or greater power, making the prospect 
of success small.
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The problem for the system consists in assuring that 
an aggressor will be met by a force of equal or greater 
strength, and that should a war result that it will not be 
pursued with such vigor and bitterness as to bring about 
the destruction of any of the states within the system.
It is this problem that the statesmen in a manually operated 
system seek to solve, for in its solution lies increased 
security for all states with the assurance that no one 
state will be allowed to dominate, and that no war will be 
allowed to destroy any state in the system. The answer to 
the problem is seen in rendering the behavior of the states 
in the system as predictable as possible, especially in 
crisis situations.? In seeking to do this, the policy 
makers develop a set of rules (see Chapter I) for the 
functioning of the system that is at least implicitly 
agreed to by all. With such rules, and the realization of 
the necessity for abiding by them, the system may function 
in a smooth manner, allowing each state within the system 
to experience a greater sense of security.
While a manual balance of power system operates in 
order that security may be enhanced by creating machinery 
to correct quickly imbalances in the system, a bipolar
Ill
system may not be operated in such a manner, for there 
exists no method of correcting imbalances, due to the fact 
that there are only two essential actors in the system. A 
manual bipolar system evolves from an automatic bipolar 
system as a part of an almost natural process (given, of 
course, that the automatic system does not break down into 
an all out war that destroys both super powers). In an 
automatic bipolar system one finds two super powers poised 
against each other, each wishing to destroy the other, but 
at the same time fearing that any attempt to do so would 
result in its own destruction. In such a situation it 
would seem quite natural that both would attempt at first 
to gather about it all the manifestations of power that it 
could in the hope that it might gain a decisive advantage, 
thereby allowing it to do away with the opponent and remain 
alone to dominate. Accompanying these efforts to gain the 
upper hand there is a severe fear lest the opposing super 
power develop a means by which it would land on top. This 
fear creates a contagious competition between the super 
powers that serves to heighten their distrust of one an - 
other, and drives them to extremes in behavior.
It is in the midst, and as a result, of this
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competition that sober minds realize the necessity of easing 
the tensions between the super powers before a disastrous 
war develops. It is this attempt to ease tensions that 
results in the creation of a manual bipolar system. There 
is no particular machinery set up for the purpose of deal - 
ing with imbalances, rather the super powers continue to 
resort to contagious competition, but with a leash placed 
upon propaganda that might serve to maintain tensions.
The main purpose of the manual operation of a bipolar system 
consists in avoiding conflicts between the super powers 
and clashes between lesser states that might draw in the 
super powers. Thus, one finds that the major difference 
between the operation of a manual balance of power system 
and a manual bipolar system is that in the balance of power 
system attempts are made to insure that the equilibrating 
process will function properly, while in the bipolar system 
attempts are made to guarantee that no resort need be made 
to any type of equilibrating process, for none exists that 
will function with certainty.
There are, however, certain similarities in the op - 
eration of both systems. An effort is made in each system 
to temper the behavior of the essential actors. In a
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balance of power system this is done by creating machinery 
that will, with certainty, meet any attempt at hegemony 
with whatever force is necessary to prevent success. A 
bipolar system modifies behavior to the extent that the 
super powers reduce their use of propaganda and other de - 
vices that serve to increase tensions. Consensus regarding 
the rules by which the manual system is governed and com - 
munication between states in order that these rules might 
be observed and enforced are essential, to the operation of 
both systems. This consensus may be explicitly agreed to, 
or it may be tacit, resulting from a thorough understanding 
of international political theory, and from studying the 
policies and responses of each actor. In a balance of 
power system, consensus and communication are necessary in 
the development of leagues of defense, for all states must 
share in the desire to create alliances when necessary and 
must be able to communicate well in order that they might 
be formed. A bipolar system requires consensus between 
the super powers regarding the necessity of avoiding con - 
flicts whenever and wherever possible, and communication 
in order that each might know the other’s intentions 
whenever a crisis erupts. Unilateral action without prior
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consultation with other essential actors is avoided, for it 
would give the impression of capriciousness, endangering 
both the predictability needed in a balance of power system, 
and the delicate equilibrium between the super powers that 
the bipolar system seeks to maintain.
In conclusion, it may be stated that both a balance of 
power system and a bipolar system are constructed of in - 
dependent states that must maintain their own security.
The manner in which these states attempt to do this is 
influenced by the number of essential actors found in the 
system. In a balance of power system, with three or more 
essential actors, states may not only develop their in - 
dividual strengths, but they may also form power alliances 
to aid in the search for greater security. A bipolar 
system, however, with only two super powers, does not allow 
for the use of power alliances, helping to create the con - 
ditions from which contagious competition arises.
This contagious competition helps to push the super 
powers to extremes not found in the competition among the 
great powers in a balance of power system. The contest 
between the super powers tends toward abstractions, while 
the struggle among the great powers concerns itself more
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with hard political realities. Ideological differences 
between the super powers develop an importance not found 
in any such differences among the great powers. Alliances 
in a balance of power system are far more flexible than 
are those in a bipolar system where alliances tend to be - 
come blocs.
The operation of a balance of power system may be a 
product of one of three types of policy: automatic,
semi - automatic, or manual. In a bipolar system, there 
are two types of policy: automatic and manual. In each
system, an automatic policy involves a zero - sum view of 
the system, with the states in the system attempting to 
pursue strategies aimed at propelling them into positions 
of hegemony. The adoption of manual policies involves the 
acceptance of a nonconstant - sum perception of the system 
and the abandonment of attempts at dominating the system.
A manually operated balance of power system involves an 
attempt to institutionalize the system and render the be - 
havior of the states within it predictable. A manual 
bipolar system is based upon the need to avoid confronta - 
tions between the super powers that might produce a dis - 
astrous war. Both of these manual systems demand a high
degree of consensus concerning the rules governing the op 
eration of the system. In a manual system, communication 
and consultation among the essential actors are vitally 
important if conflicts are to he avoided and security en - 
hanced.
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